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June 23 was a day of a celebration in Colombia, especially in the large cities and in the rural and
jungle zones most sharply impacted by 52 years of war between regular government forces and the
guerrillas of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, FARC).
That day, in Havana, Cuba, where the two sides have held talks since November 2012 (NotiSur,
Dec. 14, 2012), Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos and rebel leader Rodrigo Londoño,
better known as Timochenko, signed a bilateral ceasefire accord that marks the beginning of the
end for the conflict. Looking on, in representation of the two guarantor countries, were Cuban
President Raúl Castro and Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister Børge Brende. Also present were UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and representatives from Chile and Venezuela, the two countries
officially accompanying the peace process. Dozens of other high-level delegations traveled to Cuba
as well to participate in the historic developments. A definitive peace agreement is expected to be
signed July 20.
Final details still need to be worked out in two areas. The first has to do with the number and
location of the so-called “temporary hamlet zones” that will be designated as gathering areas for
the guerrillas during the initial post-conflict phase. The rebels fear that if the zones are too few and
far between, many of their combatants will be uprooted, weakening, in turn, the FARC’s ability
to become a legitimate political party. The guerrillas want the number and location of the zones
to coincide specifically with places where they plan to reinsert members into society and regular
politics.
The second unresolved issue involves the laying down of weapons. Colombia has had experiences
in the past of groups disarming only to be decimated afterwards by paramilitary organizations.
Examples include the Unión Patriótica in the late 1980s and the M-19 a decade later. Still, starting
June 28 with the arrival of the first 23 out of 450 observers the UN will dispatch to oversee the
disarmament, the FARC let it be known in Havana that it is willing to melt down all of its weapons
and use the metal obtained to erect three symbolic monuments.
The June 23 pre-accord now needs congressional approval as a way to bolster its legality (NotiSur,
June 3, 2016). From there, the Corte Constitucional, Colombia’s supreme authority on constitutional
matters, will set a date for a popular referendum on the peace deal and the mechanisms needed
to implement it. As President Santos reminded them on July 4, the 25th anniversary of the current
Constitution, the justices of the Corte Constitucional “are the key to bringing about peace.”

Concerned about campesinos
In a separate agreement, the two sides decided jointly to destroy illegal crops (namely coca, used
to make cocaine, and poppies, for heroin production) and replace them with legal alternatives as a
way to keep the campesinos (agrarian workers) who farm the aforementioned plants from having
to emigrate. The advance is the latest in a series of moves that, one by one, are helping discredit the
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scare tactics used on the Colombian people by former President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) and others
in the pro-war faction he leads (NotiSur, Jan. 9, 2015).
The crop-substitution accord was preceded by other overtures that together helped “de-escalate
the conflict and build up trust,” observers say. The first to be implemented was an agreement
between the government and guerrillas to jointly clear minefields (NotiSur, April 3, 2015). The
painstaking work began in March and is being carried out in the western departments of Antioquia
and Caldas in coordination with Norsk Folkehjelp, a Norwegian non-governmental organization.
The experimental crop-substitution project, underway since June 10, also involves personnel from
both sides and is being financed and supervised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). It is being carried out on 400 hectares of land and will benefit 450 families.
“Once the crop-substitution commitment is signed, immediate efforts will be undertaken to help
the implicated communities, which will play a central role in executing and overseeing the plan,”
the negotiators in Havana said. The agreement was signed in May 2014. The project was delayed,
however, for reasons never made public and despite insistence by the FARC that it move forward.
Last month’s long-awaited project launch occurred, interestingly enough, three days before the
world television premiere of an HBO documentary called “Guerras Ajenas” (Distant Wars). The
film calls attention to the controversial use—as part of the US-driven Plan Colombia—of glyphosate
to destroy coca fields in Antioquia and Caldas. Glyphosate, applied in the case of Colombia via
aerial sprayings, is a powerful herbicide that is “probably” carcinogenic, according to a 2015 report
from the World Health Organization (WHO) (NotiSur, July 1, 2016). While the UN agency didn’t say
definitively that glyphosate causes cancer, its findings raise enough doubt, argue environmentalists
in Colombia and elsewhere, to suspend use of the herbicide pending further investigation. There
have been no studies, furthermore, concluding that glyphosate is innocuous for humans and
animals, or that it doesn’t pollute the air, soil and fresh water sources.
“Guerras Ajenas” uses testimonies from 30 scientists, ecology groups, and Colombian and US
government and military authorities to point out the many problems associated with herbicide
use as a way to eradicate coca plantations. “In Colombia, as well as in Peru and Bolivia (the three
main producers of the plant used to make cocaine), these powerful herbicides have proven to be
a powerful weapon, because when they’re used without any accompanying effort to promote crop
substitution, they create a real social tragedy,” Colombian filmmaker Carlos Moreno, the director of
the documentary, said in an interview published June 1 by Semana, a Bogotá-based newsmagazine.
Moreno and Colombian environmentalists see the new eradication project as a huge improvement
because it also promotes and helps finance crop-substitution and thus protects campesinos from
being uprooted and forced off their land, as was the case with the excessive use of herbicides.
The pitfalls of plebiscites
As Colombians look toward the next steps in the peace process, some sectors are questioning
whether a plebiscite—with a categorical question that can only be answered with a simple “Yes” or
“No”—is really the best way to gauge public opinion on a matter of such fundamental importance.
The question is particularly pressing in light of the recent Brexit referendum, which set the stage for
Great Britain’s withdrawal from the European Union.
The Bogotá daily El Tiempo, seeking insight from overseas, raised the issue with Jürg Steiner, a
professor emeritus at the University of Bern, in Switzerland. “One of the risks with a plebiscite is
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 80033
ISSN: 1060-4189

that people use their vote to express frustrations that go beyond the question at hand,” said Steiner,
an expert on Colombian issues who also teaches at the University of North Carolina in the US. “To a
degree, this is what happened with the Brexit. There were people who voted in favor of leaving the
EU because they wanted, for example, to reduce immigration by Muslims.”
Some people worry about a similar result in Colombia, according to Semana. “By leaving final
approval of the [peace] accord in the hands of a people who’ve experienced more than 50 years of
wounds and hardships, it could be that the old animosities take over and result in a negative vote
that delivers a mortal blow to the chance for peace,” the Bogotá weekly wrote.
Semanaand El Tiempo, along with Steiner and other European intellectuals, all agree on a central
idea: that it’s not always best to submit such complex issues to a popular vote. The current situation
in Europe is a case in point, but it’s not the only one. For another example of how plebiscites can be
problematic, one only need look south, to Uruguay and its president, Tabaré Vázquez.
Uruguay, together with Switzerland, is the Western nation most experienced with up-down
referendums. Since 1989, it has held eight such votes and was able, as a result, to protect its state
assets against the neoliberal privatization push that took hold in the region in the 1990s. Uruguay
twice came up short, however, with referendums (in 1989 and again in 2009) aimed at scrapping
an amnesty law that protects people who committed crimes against humanity during the last civilmilitary dictatorship (1973-1985) (NotiSur, Nov. 6, 2009).
Vázquez was a lead campaigner for the failed amnesty annulment effort in 1989. Twenty years
later, when the second plebiscite took place, he was finishing his first term as president (2005-2010).
“Putting that kind of issue to a popular vote was a mistake,” Vázquez, who returned to the
presidency last year, later admitted. “Things like punishing killers, or peace, are sensitive issues.
And philosophical questions, issues that are profoundly conceptual, can’t be reduced to a simple
‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Hopefully others won’t have to suffer what we Uruguayans learned the hard way.”

-- End --
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